# Leaked RabbitMQ Connection String? Change the Password

> RabbitMQ or AMQP connection string exposed on GitHub? Change the user password, close open connections and review the queues. Step-by-step guide.

Source: https://leakwatch.net/secrets/amqp-connection-string

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Databases & keys · Secret guide

# Leaked RabbitMQ/AMQP Connection String: what to do in the first hour

Critical severityDetected onlyLast verified October 23, 2026 · 5 min read

An AMQP connection string holds the host, the user name and the password for a message broker, most often RabbitMQ. Whoever holds it can log in as that user and do whatever the user is allowed to do: publish messages into queues your application trusts, read messages from queues that carry orders, customer details or internal events, and, if the user has administrative rights, change the broker’s configuration. A message broker often sits between services, so one leaked login can reach several systems at once. Change the password first, then check what the user did and what it could reach.

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Provider

Other

Severity

Critical

Impact

Payments and customer data

Checked live by LeakWatch

No

## What an AMQP connection string looks like

The string starts with the scheme, then the user name and password separated by a colon, an `@` sign, the host, and optionally a port and a virtual host. The `amqps://` scheme means TLS is used:

```text
amqps://<user>:<password>@<host>:5671/<vhost>   AMQP connection string (placeholders)
```

The password is the secret. The rest tells you where the broker is and which virtual host the application uses. Be aware that a connection string may hold a password that is percent-encoded, so a `%` sign inside it is normal. Some hosted services, such as managed RabbitMQ offerings, issue a string with a long random password and a generated user name. The format is the same, but the console that manages the user is different.

## How AMQP connection strings get leaked

-   **Application configuration.** A `CELERY_BROKER_URL`, `AMQP_URL` or `RABBITMQ_URL` setting in a settings file or a Docker Compose file, committed with the code.
-   **Environment files.** A `.env` file that lists the broker URL next to the database and API credentials.
-   **Infrastructure code.** A Helm chart, a Kubernetes manifest or a Terraform file with the broker password written in plain text instead of a secret reference.
-   **Local tutorials.** A broker started with a default user for a demo, then its URL copied into a repository.
-   **Logs and crash reports.** A framework that prints its broker settings on startup, or an exception that includes the connection URL.

## What to do in the first hour

1.  **Identify the user and the broker.** Read the user name and the host from the string. Find the broker in your own infrastructure, or in the console of the hosted service that runs it, and confirm that the user is the one in the leaked string.
2.  **Create or pick a replacement credential.** Prefer a new user for the service, with only the permissions it needs on the virtual host it uses. Store its password in your secret manager.
3.  **Deploy the new connection string** to every service that uses the broker, then confirm that each one still publishes and consumes.
4.  **Change the exposed password.** Use the steps in the RabbitMQ revoke section below. Once the old password is gone, any client still using it cannot reconnect.
5.  **Close the open connections** that used the old credential, so that a session already logged in does not keep running.
6.  **Review the queues and the logs.** Check the broker’s management views for the period since the exposure. Look for new users, changed permissions, unexpected connections from unknown addresses, and messages published to queues you did not expect.
7.  **Check what the messages carried.** If the queues hold personal data, orders or tokens, decide whether any of it was read, and follow your incident process if it was.
8.  **Clean the repository.** Remove the string from the working tree and rewrite history if the repository is public. See [I accidentally pushed an API key to GitHub](/blog/i-accidentally-pushed-an-api-key-to-github).

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## Revoke it at RabbitMQ

RabbitMQ does not issue separate tokens for AMQP. The user name and password are the credential, so revocation means changing the password or removing the user. In the management interface, open the admin area, choose the user from the list, and set a new password or delete the user and create a replacement. From a shell on the broker host, `rabbitmqctl change_password` does the same job for the named user. Then close the open connections for that user from the connections page or with the matching `rabbitmqctl` command. Hosted services have their own consoles for users and connections, and the steps there replace these. If your setup differs from this description, follow the current RabbitMQ documentation on users and authentication.

## How LeakWatch detects it

The rule is called “RabbitMQ/AMQP Connection String”. It matches a URL that starts with `amqp://` or `amqps://`, then a user name of 3 to 50 characters that is not whitespace, a colon, `@` or a slash, then a password of 3 to 50 characters with the same restriction, then an `@` sign and a host made of letters, digits, dots, hyphens, percent signs, slashes and colons. The match needs the whole user-and-password section to be present, so a bare scheme or a string without credentials is not reported. The severity is **critical**, because the credential can reach every queue the user can open. **This type is not checked live**: LeakWatch does not connect to the broker with the value it found, so a hit tells you the string has the right form, not that it still works.

LeakWatch detects this format but does **not** check it live: it can tell you the key is exposed, not whether it still works. Assume it does until you have revoked it.

## FAQ

Can someone read the messages already in the queues?

Possibly. A user with read permission on a queue can consume its messages, and in some setups fetching a message removes it from the queue. Check the broker’s logs for connections under that user during the exposure, and review the queue contents for sensitive payloads.

Is the string safe if the password is percent-encoded?

Encoding does not hide it. A percent-encoded password decodes to the same value, and it is just as usable. Treat the whole string as the secret.

Do I need to change the user name too?

Not always. Changing the password stops the leaked string from working. Changing the user name is worth doing if the name is shared with other systems or if the account has broad rights.

## Related

-   [Database Connection String](/secrets/database-connection-string)
-   [Vault Service Token](/secrets/vault-service-token)
-   [AWS access key](/secrets/aws-access-key)
-   [I accidentally pushed an API key to GitHub](/blog/i-accidentally-pushed-an-api-key-to-github)
-   [Which vendors leak most this week](/leaks/trends)
-   [All secret guides](/secrets)

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