# Leaked Auth0 Management API Token? Rotate Now > Auth0 Management API token exposed? Rotate the application secret, review tenant logs for new users and apps, then clean the code. Step-by-step guide. Source: https://leakwatch.net/secrets/auth0-management-api-token --- [LeakWatch](/) [Product](/product)[Live feed](/leaks)[Guides](/secrets)[Blog](/blog)[Free scan](/) 1. [Home](/) 2. [Secrets](/secrets) 3. Auth0 Management API Token Cloud · Secret guide # Leaked Auth0 Management API Token: what to do in the first hour Critical severityDetected onlyLast verified October 23, 2026 · 4 min read An Auth0 Management API token lets its holder call the Auth0 Management API for your tenant. Depending on the scopes granted to the application, that can mean reading and creating users, changing connections and applications, and reading tenant logs. The Management API controls the identity system behind your sign-in, so a leak here is one of the most serious a team can have. Rotate the application’s secret first, then check the tenant logs for what happened. [Check your GitHub account for leaked secrets — free](/) Provider Auth0 Severity Critical Impact Cloud infrastructure access Checked live by LeakWatch No ## What an Auth0 Management API Token looks like Auth0 issues management tokens as JSON Web Tokens: three base64 segments separated by dots. The first segment begins with the characters `ey`, and that is what the detection looks for. The payload names the audience, which is the Management API of your tenant, and the scopes the application was granted. ```text ey…XXXX.…XXXX.…XXXX Auth0 management token (masked) ``` Do not confuse the token with the application’s client secret. The client secret is what the application uses to request a new token, so anyone who holds it can keep asking for tokens for as long as the secret stays valid. A token is short-lived by design, but the secret is not. If you find a token in a leak, treat the client secret next to it as leaked too. ## How Auth0 Management API Tokens get leaked - **Scripts that print tokens.** A script that fetches a management token and writes it to a log or to a file that gets committed. - **Application configuration.** A file with the tenant domain, client ID and client secret, committed alongside the code. - **Quickstart code.** Tutorials and sample projects copied with the real values still filled in. - **Shared admin scripts.** A debugging script or a ticket attachment with a token pasted in. - **CI variables.** Client secrets exposed to every job in a pipeline, including jobs that run code from untrusted contributors. ## What to do in the first hour 1. **Find the application.** Identify which Auth0 application requested the token. A machine-to-machine application that uses the client credentials flow is the usual source. If you can read the token, its client identifier is in the payload. 2. **Rotate the application’s client secret.** In the Auth0 Dashboard, open that application’s settings and rotate its client secret. Rotation makes the old secret useless for requesting new tokens. 3. **Update the deployment** with the new secret, and confirm the job or service can still get a token. 4. **Reduce the scopes.** Open the application’s API permissions for the Management API and remove every scope it does not need. A token can only do what its scopes allow. 5. **Check the tenant logs.** Open the tenant logs in the Dashboard and filter for the period since the exposure. Look for token requests from unfamiliar places, new applications, changed connections, new users, password changes and role assignments. 6. **Look at users and applications.** Check for users you did not create and applications you do not recognize. Review any connection or login rule that changed recently. 7. **Clean the repository.** See [I accidentally pushed an API key to GitHub](/blog/i-accidentally-pushed-an-api-key-to-github), and use [deep scan your whole git history](/blog/deep-scan-your-whole-git-history) to find older copies. Not sure what else leaked? [Run a free scan](/). [Not sure what else leaked? Run a free scan.](/) ## Revoke it at Auth0 Open the application settings in the Auth0 Dashboard, in the tenant the token came from, and rotate the client secret of the application that requested it. Confirm the tenant name first, since an application with the same name can exist in more than one tenant. A token that was already issued generally stays valid until it expires, so rotation stops new tokens while the old ones end on their own schedule. Keep that window in mind when you review the logs. ## How LeakWatch detects it The rule is called Auth0 Management API Token. It looks for the word `auth0` in any letter case, followed within 40 characters on the same line by a value that begins with `ey` and continues with letters, digits, dots, underscores or hyphens. The two conditions must both hold, so a token-shaped string that is far from the word is not reported. The severity is **critical**. This type is not checked live: LeakWatch does not send the token or the client secret to Auth0. LeakWatch detects this format but does **not** check it live: it can tell you the key is exposed, not whether it still works. Assume it does until you have revoked it. ## FAQ Can someone change my users with this token? Yes, within the scopes granted to the application. A management token with user scopes can create, change and read users, so treat the tenant as exposed until the logs show otherwise. Does rotating the client secret end the token? Rotation stops the old secret from requesting new tokens. A token that was already issued generally stays valid until it expires, so review the logs during that window and do not assume the exposure ended at rotation. Which is more dangerous, the token or the client secret? The client secret, because it lasts. Anyone who has it can request fresh tokens at any time. Rotate it first, even if you only saw a token in the leak. ## Related - [Vault Service Token](/secrets/vault-service-token) - [GCP Service Account Key](/secrets/gcp-service-account-key) - [GitHub Personal Access Token](/secrets/github-personal-access-token) - [I accidentally pushed an API key to GitHub](/blog/i-accidentally-pushed-an-api-key-to-github) - [Which vendors leak most this week](/leaks/trends) - [All secret guides](/secrets) [Get alerted next time a secret leaks — create a free account](/) LeakWatch is not affiliated with Auth0. ![Gabriel Diyan, founder of LeakWatch](/brand/Photo-Gabriel-Diyan.webp) Gabriel Diyan (0xCr0c0) Cybersecurity student, founder of LeakWatch. I built and run the scanner described here — the detection patterns, the false-positive classifier and the provider validators are mine. [More about who I am](/about). [GitHub](https://github.com/Leakwatch-Scan) · [X](https://x.com/LeakwatchScan) · [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/gabriel-diyan-80a378375) · [GitHub (personal)](https://github.com/crocogab) LeakWatch Secrets leak into public commits every minute. This watches the forges for yours. Built and run by [Gabriel Diyan](/about), a cybersecurity student — [why LeakWatch exists](/about). 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